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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
JUDICIAL REVIEW: SEPARABILITY OF CERTIFICATION UNDER
SECTION 801 FROM ACQUISITION UNDER SECTION 408
Department Editor: Broudy Simons*

A

MONG the problems presented by the Civil Aeronautics Board's treat-

ment of the North Atlantic Route Transfer Case ' was one involving
a further manifestation of the interaction of functions of the President
and the Board under Section 801.2 In the landmark case of Chicago &

Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,3 the Supreme Court

held that an order granting or denying application for certificate of convenience and necessity to engage in foreign air transportation, which is
subject to the approval of the President under Section 801, may not be subjected to judicial review under Section 1006. 4 An application and extension
of this rule is to be found in Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics
Board et al.,5 the most recent development in the North Atlantic Route
determinations.
* Student Editor, Legal Publications Board Northwestern University School
of Law.
I Prior to 1940, Pan American was the only air carrier authorized to engage
in foreign and overseas transportation over the North Atlantic Route. The first
competition came from American Overseas Airlines (formerly American Export
Lines). American Export Air, Transportation Service, 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940). In
1944, after determination of postwar routes, other carriers were invited to submit
applications for the various routes, resulting in the issuance of a third certificate
of public convenience and necessity to Trans-World Airlines. Northeast Air,
et al., North Atlantic Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319 (1945). In 1948, PAA and AOA instituted a proceeding with the CAB to obtain approval of a proposed acquisition
by PAA of AOA; the proceeding was consolidated with other proceedings, and
denominated the North Atlantic Route Transfer Case (Docket No. 3589 et al.).
TWA was permitted to intervene, to oppose the acquisition.
2 52 STAT. 1014 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §601 (Supp. 1951): "The issuance, denial,
transfer, amendment, cancellation, suspension, or revocation of, and the terms,
conditions, and limitations contained in, any certificate authorizing an air carrier
to engage in overseas or foreign air transportation, or air transportation between
places in the same Territory or possession, or any permit issuable to any foreign
air carrier under section 482, shall be subject to the approval of the President.
Copies of all applications in respect of such certificates and permits shall be
transmitted to the President by the Civil Aeronautics Board before hearing
thereon, and all decisions thereon by the Civil Aeronautics Board shall be submitted to the President before publication thereof. This section shall not
apply to the issuance or denial of a certificate issuable under section 481 (e) or
any permit issuable under section 482(c) or to the original terms, conditions, or
limitations of any such certificate or permit."
3 333 U.S. 103 (1948); reversing Waterman Steamship Corp. v CAB, 159
F. 2d 828 (5th Cir. 1947), note 24 infra.
4 52 STAT. 1024 (1938), 49 U.S.C. 646(a) (Supp. 1951): "Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board under this chapter, except any order in
respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the President as
provided in section 601 of this chapter, shall be subject to review by the circuit
court of appeals of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia upon petition, filed within sixty days after the entry of
such order, by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order."
5 184 F. 2d 66 (2d Cir. 1950). Other respondents joined with the CAB were
PAA, AOA, and American Airlines (the latter owns a majority of AOA's stock).
This cause was joined with Sparks et al. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, in which
the petitioners, employees of PAA and AOA, moved to stay discharges which
would result from the acquisition. Like instant case, the petitions were dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. The Sparks petitioners only sought review (filed 19
U.S.L. WEEK 3235, March 5, 1951).
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In 1948 Pan American (PAA) and American Overseas (AOA), both
holding certificates to engage in air transport over the North Atlantic, instituted proceedings before the CAB to obtain approval of a proposed acquisition by PAA of AOA. The acquisition of control was to be accomplished
by (1) PAA's acquisition of AOA's property, business and assets under
Section 408 0 of the Act, and (2) a transfer to PAA of AOA's certificate
of public convenience and necessity under Section 401 (i).7 The Board's
final order 8 approving the acquisition was then approved by the President.
On review, TWA argued that if the acquisition were allowed its competitive
position would be injured, and that the procedure followed by the Board
in promulgation of the order was improper.9 Respondents, relying on the
Waterman holding, contended that review under Section 1006 is not available in instances in which Presidential approval is required under Section
801. Conceding that the Waterman rule was applicable to the issue of judicial review as to certification, TWA pointed out that the order relating to
acquisition of assets, covered by Section 408, was not within Section 801,
and would thus be the proper subject of review. The court concluded, however, that where the acquisition and certification are "inextricably mingled
in the same proceeding," the Congressional purpose in granting discretion
to the President as to foreign transport would be thwarted if judicial review
were permitted.1 0
The basic point of conflict arises with the granting of power to Congress
to regulate commerce with foreign nations," as against the President's
responsibility for the proper conduct of our foreign relations.' 2 In the area
of issuance of certificates, the determination, based upon the Board's technical and expert knowledge of the field, is submitted to the President prior
to publication. In this respect, the CAB, as was suggested in the Waterman
case, is acting as a body of investigators who assist the President in obtaining the needed data. 13 To this data is then added the confidential information from diplomatic sources. The need for interposition of the President
at this point cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the
significance of foreign air transportation in our international policy and
national defense.' 4 To carry on such commercial service today of necessity
involves the machinery of diplomatic negotiation for access to, landing rights
652 STAT. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §488 (Supp. 1951).
7 52 STAT. 989 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §481(i) (Supp. 1951).
8 Prior to the final order, which is the subject of this note, the Board originally had denied the application on June 1, 1950. The President approved the
order on June 29, 1950, and returned it to the Board with his signature affixed.
The next day, prior to publication, the President recalled his approval, and
ordered the Board to approve the acquisition, with which it complied on July 10,
1950. TWA and Sparks et al. argued, inter alia, that the original order became
effective the day the President signed it, that the subsequent order was ineffective
for want of notice and hearing, and, as such, was a violation of due process.
The court, however, held that the finality of the order depended on approval by
the President, the final arbiter. 184 F. 2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1950).
9 Note 8 supra.
10 184 F. 2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1950).
11 U.S. CONST. Art. I. §8.
12 U.S. CONST. Art. II, §§1 and 2. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936) (with authorization from Congress, President issued embargo on export of arms) ; Prize Cases, 2 Black 625 (U.S. 1862) (without authorization by Congress, President proclaimed blockade).
13United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940); Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); Hampton & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
14 "Congress may of course delegate very large grants of its power over
foreign commerce to the President . . .The President also possesses in his own
right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief
and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs. For present purposes, the order
draws vitality from either or both sources. Legislative and Executive powers are

JUDICIAL
in, and other privileges of the air over foreign countries furthermore, full
disclosure of such data would serve only to imperil the national defense, and
resolution of a foreign policy, infused with elements of prophecy, would
otherwise be thwarted. 15 Notwithstanding the strong policy arguments in
favor of denying review under circumstances in which the President's discretion is involved, it is to be noted that, while the Waterman case was concerned specifically with the type of certification problem to which the Congress directed its attention in enacting Section 801,16 an added factor, that
of acquisition of physical assets, not involved in the Waterman case, is the
crux of the problem in the Trans World case.
Closer analogy to the fact-situation in Trans World might thus be found
in Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil Aernautics Board et al.17 In an
action based upon a CAB order granting a certificate, but dismissing an
application for acquisition of control,' 8 the court refused to review the
certification, but as to the acquisition, held that such order did not require
Presidential action under Section 801, for its validity "depends, in the case
of the order dismissing the application under Section 408, upon questions
in which the discretion of the President is not involved . . ."19 Although
finding nothing inconsistent in the situation where the certificate is issued
prior to approval of the acquisition, or even where the acquisition has been
refused, 20 the court went on to reverse and remand the Board's action under
Section 408. While, on its face, it appears to be strong precedent for separability of certification and acquisition, distinguishing factors are apparent.
The Pan American court cited with approval the holdings of the ICC, in
cases arising under the Motor Carrier Act, as standing for the proposition
that the Board is not required to withhold the certificate until it has approved the acquisition of control, and that the issue as to whether the use
of the mode of transport will promote the public interest relates only to the
approval of the acquisition, and not to the certificate. The value of such
an analogy in this area today is somewhat dubious, in light of the adamant
refusal of the Waterman court to accept a comparison of decisions simply
because the holdings were made in another phase of the transportation industry. 22 Secondly, the fact that the prospective transferee was a steampooled obviously to the end that commercial strategic and diplomatic interests of
the country may be coordinated and advanced without collision or deadlock between agencies." Waterman, note 3 supra, U.S. 103, 109 (1948). See also 802
(52 STAT. 1014, (1938) 49 U.S.C. §602 (Supp. 1951) ; prescribing the role of the
Secretary of State in negotiations with foreign governments for establishment
and devplopment of air navigation.
15 Waterman, note 3 supra, 303 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
16 83 CONG. REc. 6853-6854, 6858-6859 (1938). Hearings Before Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. 9738, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938),
at 38, 40, 146.
17 121 F. 2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941).
Is American Export Airlines, a subsidiary of American Export Lines, applied
to the CAB for a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing it to operate by air between the United States and Portugal, and for an order of approval
of acquisition of control by the parent corporation. The CAB granted a temporary
certificate, but dismissed the application on acquisition. The court, in affirming
on review, felt that if it reviewed the action of the Board, it would "be placed
in a position where we might be obliged to reverse a tribunal whose subsequent
action the President might decline to approve." 121 F. 2d 810, 814 (1941).
19 121 F. 2d 810, 815 (1941).
20 "We find no provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act requiring the Board
to withhold certificates until after approval of the control . . ." 121 F. 2d 810,
816 (1941).
21 191 F. 2d 810, 815-816 (1941).
22 Waterman, note 3 supra, 303, U.S. 103. 106-108 (1948).
Although this
dicta would not serve to refute the well-established analogies among the various
transportation fields as to tort, contract, and property concepts, the Waterman
case would seem to indicate that the overlapping does not extend to the field
of administrative law.
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ship company, for which Section 408 does not require an approval of acquisition, or that it involved the acquisition by a subsidiary corporation of
its parent rather than of one air carrier by another, might serve to render
the Pan American case of little value; however, no basis for such arguments
may be found in the precedents. Lastly, the basic vitality of the Pan American case must rest on the extent to which the Waterman case has nullified
its effect. Although only the certification issue arose in the Waterman
case, the question is still open as to how that court, divided 5-to-4, would
have handled the problem of acquisition. Certainly the Trans World case,
arising in the same circuit as the Pan American case, would appear to have
reversed the earlier case on the basis of what the Waterman case might
have held; otherwise, there is no basis on which to reconcile the transformation from a view of complete severability to the present view that the
issues are "inextricably mingled." However, this argument would presuppose that Waterman overruled Pan American. On the contrary, the Waterman case was reviewed to resolve a conflict 23 between the 5th circuit 24
and the Pan American case, the Supreme Court reversing the 5th circuit.
Assuming, therefore, that the Pan American case continues to stand
for the proposition that there are fact situations in which the President's
discretion is not controlling, the next inquiry is as to the nature of those
areas, based on both the statute and policy considerations. The test would
seem to be the extent to which the participation of the President is allowed
on the consideration of his responsibility for the integrity of our foreign
affairs. In the Waterman case, the Solicitor General conceded that circumstances might arise where judicial review would be appropriate. 25 The various conditions precedent to issuance of a certificate, such as public notice
and hearing under Section 401 (c),26 and the requirements as to the terms
and conditions of the certificate under Section 401 (f),27 would constitute
appropriate Board action, and therefore be reviewable. The Waterman
court also assumed that its opinion was limited to orders of the Board
which arise "by proceedings not challenged as, to regularity. ' 28 The dissent
was also concerned particularly with the possibility of lack of control over
the Board's acting in a lawless manner. 29 As a further example of the
argument that Section 801 does not give the President control over all such
orders is the authority to issue orders fixing mail rates payable to both
domestic and foreign carriers, which is vested exclusively in the Board
under Section 406.30
Waterman, note 3 supra, 303 U.S. 103, 105 (1948).
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 159 F. 2d 828
(5th Cir. 1947). Upon the CAB's denial of Waterman's application for certification, Waterman appealed. The 5th Circuit disclaimed any power to review the
President's action, but regarded any Board order as incomplete until court review,
after which the completed action must be approved by the President; accordingly,
it refused to dismiss and asserted jurisdiction.
25 Government's Brief, pp. 52-53.
2652 STAT. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §481(c) (Supp. 1951).
2752 STAT. 988 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §481(f) (Supp. 1951).
(The certificate
must permit the handling of foreign mail, but may not restrict the right of the
carripr to add to or change schedules.) However, this exception is covered
specifically in the last sentence of §801, note 2 supra.
28 Waterman, note 3 supra, 303 U.S. 103, 105 (1948).
This language construction was affirmed in Seaboard & Western Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
181 F. 2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1949). This is the crux of argument in the Trans World
case as to the regularity of the two orders issued by the Board (see note 8 supra).
29 "Presidential approval cannot make valid invalid orders of the Board."
Waterman, note 3 supra, 303 U.S. 103, 116 (1948). "The Board can act in a lawless way. With that in mind, Congress sought to preserve the intergrity of the
administrative process by making judicial review a check on Board actions." 303
U.S. 103, 117 (1948).
80 52 STAT. 998 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §486 (Supp. 1951).
22
24
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For purposes of the Trans World case, however, the question looked
more to the problem of separability than to that of regularity. The argument suggested 31 would construe the final order as a dual entity: a statement by the Board that the carrier is fit, willing and able to fly the route,
which the Board deems demanded by public convenience and necessity, and
a statement by the President that the operation of the route has been coordinated with our foreign policy. The statutory standards 32 required by
the former would put the court in a position to settle that question conclusively, regardless of the President's determination on the latter. Petitioners in the Trans World case pointed out that in practice the Board had
issued several orders without making them subject to, or obtaining, Presidential approval, even though overseas, foreign or territorial air transport
was involved;38 in answering this argument, the CAB pointed out that these
were the result of a mere inadvertant failure rather than a conscious
refusal to submit the orders to the President, and were decided before the
Waterman case, which focused attention on the issue. The court rejected
TWA's contention without discussion. In any event, the Board today, considering itself bound by the President's action in such instances, would be
reluctant not to act in accordance with the Waterman view of the scope
of authority of the President.3 4 It is at this point that the problem arises:
how far will the Board tend in submitting matters to the President, so as
to conform to the "inextricably mingled" test.
To achieve separability, the proper line of inquiry might better be based
on pure administrative policy considerations. Thus in the Trans World
case, TWA might have succeeded by attempting to distinguish the factors
and standards requisite for issuance of a certificate, on the one hand, and
those for approval of an acquisition, on the other. When the Board passes
on a certificate, it must determine that the carrier is fit, willing and able
to perform such transportation properly. In deciding whether the standard
is met, the factors involved are whether a useful public service, responsive
to a public need, will be served thereby, whether this purpose can be served
adequately by existing facilities, whether the cost to the government will
be outweighed by the benefit which will accrue to the public from the new
service, and whether the applicant can serve the purpose without impairing
the operations of existing carriers. 85 The President must thus be bound, to
some extent, by some of the same considerations. In passing on an application for acquisition, however, the Board looks to the standards of public
interest set forth in Section 2,8 6 weighs the factors of competition ands1 15 J. AIR L. & C. 474, 477 (1948).
32 "Those orders which do not require Presidential approval are subject to
judicial review to assure application of the standards Congress has laid down."
Waterman, note 3 supra, 303 U.S. 103, 109 (1948).
33 National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control Case, 6 C.A.B. 671 (1946)
(application denied); American Airlines, Control of American Export Airlines, 6 C.A.B.
371 (1945) (approved); Acquisition of Cordova Air Service, by Alaska Airlines,
4 C.A.B. 708 (1944) (denied both acquisition and certification) ; American Export
Airlines, Inc.-American Export Lines-Control-American Export Airlines, 3 C.A.B.
619 (194) (denied); Marine Airways, Alaska Air Transport-Consolidation, 3
C.A.B. 315 (1942) (approved); Wien Alaska Airlines-Acquisition of Mirow Air
Service, 3 C.A.B. 207 (1941); Pan American Airways-Acquisition of Pan American Airways-Africa, Ltd., 3 C.A.B. 32 (1941) (approved).
34 In the TransWorld case, early in the proceedings, in its order establishing
the scope of the issues, the Board indicated that its order would be submitted to
the President for his approval. Order No. E-2833 (R. 158, 161). See also Pacific
Northwest Hawaii Service case, 9 C.A.B. 414 (1948); Additional Service to Latin
America, 6 C.A.B. 857 (1946).
35 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 611 (1946); 15 J.AIR L. & C. 480 (1948).
86 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. .402 (Supp. 1951). "'Public interest' as
u-ed in the Act is not a mere general reference to public welfare, but has a direct
r-lation to definite statutorv objectives, including those set forth in Section 2 of
the Act which directs the Board, -in the exercise and performance of its powers
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monopoly, the need for a balanced system, and price, and arrives at a balancing conclusion.8 7 The distinction is most readily apparent from a consideration of the factor of price. As a rule, the Board has taken a liberal
attitude toward price, but will disapprove an acquisition if found to be
excessive. Thus, as in the Pan American case, the carrier could be certified, but not have the wherewithal, the physical assets, with which to operate
the route. To obviate this inconsistency, however, the CAB could follow
its approach in the Mayflower 88 case, where the Board issued a conditional
approval, approving the purchase and the transfer of certificate on the
condition that the purchase price would not exceed a certain amount.
While there was an initial reluctance to approve the price of assets
other than those of a physical nature, 9 there is now adequate authority for including such intangibles as goodwill and prospective earnings in
the purchase price. 40 Were such operating rights given an independent
value, as within the concept of property, it would violate all earlier holdings to the effect that a certificate of convenience and necessity is in the
personal in nature, rather than a property,
nature of a permit or license,
41
contract, or franchise right.
These are the considerations inherent in determination of an acquisition
which are not necessarily the proper subject-matter to be raised in analysis
of whether or not a certificate should be issued. Once severability is conceived, the interaction of Sections 801 and 1006 should create no further
obstacle. In the final House bill, Section 1006 provided for review of "...
any orders . . . except those not properly subject to review by the courts
of law." Prior to enactment, Congress substituted the present provision
limiting the exemption from review to orders affecting foreign air carriers.
Notwithstanding the extension of the Waterman case, this change would
seem to have indicated an intent that all other orders be open to the courts.
To avoid Presidential control over all phases of foreign, overseas and territorial air commerce, contrary to the intendment of Congress, Section 1006
must be so construed; otherwise, only the Congress, by amending Section
801 so as not to include Sections 408 and 406, can avert the nebulous test
of holding issues "inextricably mingled."
Allen Meyeron*
and duties under the Act, to consider, among other things, as being in the public
interest." United Air Lines Transport Corp.-Acquisition of Western Air Express
Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940); Braniff Airways, Inc., et al., Acquisition of Aerovias
Braniff, S.A., 6 C.A.B. 947 (1946). It might be argued, however, that the concept of public interest is to be found in certification also. See §§401(i) and
412(b) (52 STAT. 989 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §481(i) (Supp. 1951), and 52 STAT.
1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §492(b) (Supp. 1951).
37 Woods, What are the Considerations of the Board in an Application for
Acquisition of Assets? 37 GEO. L. J. 66 (1948). For balancing of factors, see
American Airlines-Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, 7 C.A.B.
365 (1946).
38 Acquisition of Mayflower Airlines, by Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 680
(1944) (The transferee was willing to pay more, but the Board limited the price
to $10,000).
39 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1 (1940).
40 Western-United, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947);
Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940). Criticized strongly in
48 COL. L. REV. 88 (1948), 61 HARV. L. REV. 523, (1948), 15 U. OF CH. L. REV.
343 (1948).
41 Cannonball Transportation Co. v. American Stages, 53 F. 2d 1051
(S.D.E.D. Ohio 1931); In re Moritz, 174 Neb. 400, 23 N.W. 2d 545 (1948). The
argument in the dissent in the Western-United case, note 40 supra, that the
certificate is a public grant, and cannot be assigned value, as such, is consistent
with these cases. Furthermore, §401(f) of the Act (52 STAT. 990 (1938) 49
U.S.C. 481(j) (Supp. 1951) provides that: "No certificate shall confer any proprietary property, or exclusive right . .
* Competitor, Legal Publications Board Northwestern University School
of -Law.

